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ABSTRACT
In 2016, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) announced its Vision 2030 strategic 
plan incorporating major changes to the economic structure of the country, in­
cluding an intention to deploy 9.5 GW of renewable energy in an effort to reduce 
the penetration of oil in the electricity generation system. This paper assesses the 
macroeconomic impact of such changes in the KSA, coupled with reductions in 
implicit energy subsidies. Based on a dynamic general equilibrium model, our 
analysis suggests that if the KSA government were to deploy a relatively small 
quantity of renewable technology, consistent with the country’s Vision 2030 
plans, there would be a positive impact on the KSA’s long run GDP and on 
households’ welfare. However, we demonstrate that if the integration costs of 
renewable technology were high, then households’ welfare would be maximized 
at around 30–40 percent renewables penetration. In addition, we show that a 
policy favoring renewable energy would increase the dependence of the KSA on 
oil, given that a larger share of GDP would be linked to oil exports and so, 
potentially, to oil price shocks. Finally, it is shown that exporting signiﬁcantly 
more oil onto the international market could have a negative impact on the in­
ternational oil price and thus could offset the potential gains from the renewable 
energy policy. 
Keywords: Saudi Arabia, renewable penetration, implicit oil subsidy, oil 
exports, welfare costs, energy transition, general equilibrium model 
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1. INTRODUCTION
In April 2016, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) announced its Vision 2030 strategic 
plan incorporating major changes to the economic structure of the country (Vision 2030, 2016). 
Vision 2030 includes plans to deploy 9.5 GW of renewable energy in an effort to reduce the 
proportion of oil used in the electricity generation system. Some of the reasons behind this move 
in the KSA—and in the rest of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries—include: the growing 
interest in this region of the world in tackling the climate change agenda; the authorities’ desire to 
reduce the dependence of their economies on fossil fuels; and the expected future increase in energy 
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demand that will reduce revenues from oil exports. Renewable energy technology is therefore seen 
as one way to help address all these challenges. 
The economic impacts of deploying renewable energy in the KSA are arguably different 
to those in (almost) any other country of the world, for three reasons.1 First, the main source of 
primary energy used to produce electricity in the KSA is oil (Electricity and Cogeneration Regu­
latory Authority, 2015), something which is less common in other parts of the world. Second, 
according to Matar et al. (2015, 2016) the oil used in the electricity sector is highly subsidized. 
Third, the KSA is an oil producer, which implies that the subsidized oil used domestically could 
instead be exported at international prices. Given these particular circumstances, the KSA is a 
particularly interesting case to study the role of renewables in such a heavily energy subsidized 
economy. 
The approach taken to try to understand the implications of the deployment of renewables 
in the KSA, at a signiﬁcant scale, in a country with highly subsidized fossil fuels, is based on a 
dynamic general equilibrium model. This approach is adopted to capture the direct and indirect 
impacts on households’ welfare under different energy policies. Dynamic general equilibrium mod­
els are becoming increasingly popular in energy economics research. They have been used to 
explore the macroeconomic effects of energy price shocks (for example, Kim and Loungani, 1992 
and Rotemberg and Woodford, 1996) and to evaluate the impact of energy policies on the business 
cycle (De Miguel and Manzano, 2006) and carbon emissions (Golosov et al. 2014). General equi­
librium models have also been used to understand the impact of fossil fuel subsidies in the economy, 
such as Plante (2014) who analyzed the asymmetric impact of oil subsidies on oil exporting coun­
tries and oil importing countries. Other studies have considered the macroeconomic effects of 
removing fossil fuel subsidies, such as Lin and Li (2012) and Schwanitz et al. (2014). Nevertheless, 
as far as we know, this is the ﬁrst attempt to combine renewable energy and energy subsidies taking 
a general equilibrium perspective. 
Other studies have focused speciﬁcally on the KSA without using a general equilibrium 
approach, such as Alyousef and Stevens (2011) who discussed the costs of administered energy 
prices in the KSA. Matar et al. (2015) consider different policy scenarios for reducing energy 
consumption in the KSA without increasing administered energy prices using a multi-sector equi­
librium model with a mixed-complementarity formulation and Matar et al. (2016) use a similar 
approach to consider the prospects for coal-ﬁred power generation in the KSA. Two further studies 
took an econometric approach: Gately et al. (2012) considered the future evolution of oil con­
sumption and its impact on oil exports in the KSA and Pierru and Matar (2014) explored the impact 
of volatile oil revenues on public investment. 
This study therefore differs from these previous studies in considering the macroeconomic 
impacts of the deployment of renewable energy at a signiﬁcant scale in the KSA using a general 
equilibrium model. The economic mechanism behind our model is straightforward; however, the 
implications are not. The model allows the government to deploy renewable technology that frees 
barrels of oil from electricity production that were sold initially at a subsidized price, but are instead 
exported at international prices—with the additional extra revenues being transferred to Saudi cit­
1. Note that some previous econometric studies have investigated whether Granger causality exists between renewable 
energy consumption and economic growth, such as Apergis and Payne (2010, 2011a, 2011b, and 2012) for the OECD 
countries, Central America, emerging market economies, and Eurasia respectively. Generally, these papers ﬁnd long-run bi­
directional causality between renewable energy consumption and growth; however, as far as we know, no similar econo­
metric studies have been published that include Saudi Arabia. 
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izens. It is recognized that Saudi Arabia is an important player in the international oil market; 
however, this does not necessarily imply that it has the ability to control international prices in the 
long run. That said, an unanticipated change in Saudi Arabia’s production could have an impact on 
the oil market in the short to medium run; consequently, we also explore how a change in the 
international price of oil can affect the potential macroeconomic beneﬁts of the deployment of 
renewable technology. 
In summary, this paper uses a dynamic general equilibrium model to analyze the impli­
cations of increasing the deployment of renewable energy technologies in the KSA, an economy 
that at present has high implicit domestic fossil fuel subsidies due to low administered prices. The 
next section therefore details the model, followed by Section 3 that discusses the calibration of the 
model. Section 4 uses the model to assess the macroeconomic effects of renewables penetration in 
the KSA and presents the main results of the analysis with a summary and conclusion presented in 
Section 5. 
2. MODEL
The KSA is represented by a dynamic general equilibrium model of a small, open econ­
omy2 that consists of: an inﬁnitely lived representative household; three sectors with representative 
ﬁrms producing electricity, energy services and ﬁnal goods and services, respectively; and a gov­
ernment that, via the state-owned oil company, collects revenues from oil exports and selling oil, 
natural gas, and renewables domestically.3 In addition, the model has been built to ﬁt the charac­
teristics of an oil exporting country, such as the KSA. Furthermore, the production and price of oil 
are assumed exogenous. 
2.1 Representative household
The representative household’s preferences are characterized by a utility function: 
1 1– σ
c σ�[cσt + dSσHc] c�t 
U(ct,SHt) = . (1)1– σ
The household’s total consumption consists of ﬁnal goods and services ( ) and energy servicesct 
(SH ), with σc determining the elasticity of substitution between the consumption and energy services t 
and σ being the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. The parameter d weights the 
relative utility derived from goods and services and from energy. The household maximizes the 
intertemporal expected discounted ﬂow of utility, subject to the budget constraint: 
2. It is an economy where capital markets and goods markets are open to international agents. This means that savings 
and investments can be different. The economy is ‘small’ because international capital markets (the international interest 
rate, in particular) are not impacted by changes in Saudi savings or Saudi investments. From a practical perspective, it 
means that the international interest rate is set exogenously. 
3. Given the structure of the KSA, it is assumed that the ‘public sector’ includes the state-owned oil company, Saudi 
Aramco, and that the all surpluses are distributed back the KSA consumers. 
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1 1– σ
σc σc σc 
∞
[ct + dSHt] 
tmax ∑ β
c ,S ,k ,b t = 0  1– σt Ht t + 1  t + 1  
subject to: 
ϕ k – k 2 t + 1  t ∗b + c + P S  + k –(1– d)k + = w n  + r k  + (1 +  r )b + TR , (2)t + 1  t St Ht t + 1  t t t t t t t t2 kt 
where β is the discount factor, bt is a one-year maturity foreign bond with a yield given by an 
exogenous international interest rate ∗ . are wages and n is labor, which is normalized to 1. r w  kt t t t 
represents capital stock in the private sector, while rt is the return of capital and d is the depreciation 
rate. Following Mendoza (1991), we assume quadratic adjustment costs in investment to avoid 
excessive volatility of this variable in the model relative to actual data. TRt >0 are government 
transfers to households. The price of the ﬁnal good is normalized to unity, thus PSt is the price of 
energy services relative to the ﬁnal good. As a way to introduce the trade balance into the small 
open economy model, it is assumed that households have access to a perfectly competitive inter­
national capital market, where they can buy and sell international bonds. The ﬁrst order conditions 
that solve the household optimization problem are presented in the appendix. 
We induce stationarity in the model assuming that the interest rate of the bond depends 
on the level of external debt, which can be interpreted as a transitory change in the sovereign risk 
premium.4 In particular, we consider that the interest rate depends on the deviations of the foreign 
∗ ∗ b – bt  ss  bond from its steady state: rt = r + (e –1) similar to Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2003). 
2.2 Government
The government owns the primary energy resources in this economy, that is, oil and natural 
gas. Oil production ( O¯ t) is an exogenous endowment that can be allocated either to the domestic 
¯market to produce electricity ( OE ) and energy services ( OS ), or to be exported ( Ot – OE – OS ). We t t t t 
do not take into consideration oil depletion, although this could be a relevant issue.5 In this model, 
we assume that current production is only a small fraction of the total reserves. This approach 
allows us to assume that the oil price is exogenously determined. Gas production ( G¯ t) is also an 
exogenous endowment and is only used in the domestic market to produce electricity. In the case 
of Saudi Arabia, natural gas is also used by the industrial sector, but given that the focus of our 
study is oil and renewable energy, we do not account for this consumption of natural gas. 
We assume that renewable energy is produced directly using public capital, which implies 
that the government, via the state-owned electricity company, invests directly in this technology. 
Alternatively, we could assume that the government provides ﬁnancial support to private investment 
in renewable technologies.6 The main difference is that in our case there are no private proﬁts, thus 
simplifying the analysis. Therefore, in the model, renewable energy is produced according to: 
4. Several methods have been proposed to make dynamic, small, open economy models stationary, such as endogenous 
discount factors, convex portfolio adjustment costs, complete asset markets, and debt elastic interest rate premiums. 
5. The potential problem of oil depletion is not an issue, at least in the case of Saudi Arabia for the foreseeable future. 
Proven reserves in the KSA, according to BP (2015), are 267 billion barrels, which represents 73 years of production. 
6. The model used here would allow for the inclusion of different types of public infrastructure, but given that the focus 
of the analysis in this paper is to understand better the impact of the deployment of renewable energy in the Saudi economy, 
these are not considered here. 
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A
¯Rt = kgt, (3)
¯1 +  w(Rt/Et) 
A 
Where represents the productivity of a unit of public capital invested in renewables, 
¯1 +  w(Rt/Et) 
or conversely, the cost of one unit of renewable energy. Note the productivity of renewables depends 
negatively on renewable penetration in electricity generation, reﬂecting integration costs on the 
electric system. 
¯ ¯ ¯Domestic prices for oil ( P ), natural gas ( P ) and renewable energy ( P ) are administered O G Rt t t 
by policymakers,7 while oil exports are priced at the international market price ( POt). 
The accumulation rule of public capital is standard and is the following: 
i = k – (1– l)k , (4)g g gt t + 1  t 
where l is the depreciation share of public capital and igt is public investment, which is a policy 
decision that determines the size of renewable technology. 
As indicated above, the government collects revenues from oil exports and from selling 
oil, natural gas and renewable energy domestically via the state-owned oil company, while govern­
ment spending consist of transfers to households and public investment. The budget constraint is 
therefore given by: 
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯P (O – O – O ) +  P (O + O ) +  P R  + P G  = i + TR , (5)O t E S O E S R t G t g tt t t t t t t t t 
where transfers are chosen to balance the government budget. 
2.3 Representative ﬁrms
We consider three different sectors producing different goods—electricity, energy services, 
and a ﬁnal good. 
2.3.1 Electricity sector 
The ﬁrm that produces electricity is a public company, as is the case in Saudi Arabia. Oil, 
natural gas, and renewables are used to produce electricity (Et ) using a linear technology given by: 
¯ ¯E = αO + βG + R , (6)t E t tt 
with all the primary energy inputs expressed in energy units and parameters α and β measuring the 
technical efﬁciency of oil and natural gas power plants. 
¯ ¯As Gt and Rt are exogenous variables, the electricity ﬁrm only has to choose the optimal 
level of OE given the prices of the primary energy inputs and the price of electricity ( PE ). We t t 
assume that the electricity ﬁrm is a price-taker and maximizes proﬁts. From the proﬁt maximization 
problem, we obtain that the marginal productivity of oil has to equal relative input prices: α = 
7. For convenience, we will assume later that domestic prices for natural gas and renewable energy will be equal to 
natural gas and renewable energy marginal productivities respectively. 
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¯PO /PE . Given the particular characteristics of this production function that could lead to a corner t t 
solution, we impose the condition that in equilibrium the marginal productivity of natural gas, oil 
and renewables are identical. This guarantees that there are no extraordinary proﬁts in the public 
company. In addition, we impose that all the natural gas produced in the country is consumed by 
the electricity company and that all renewable energy is used to produce electricity—thus avoiding 
the potential problem of indeterminacy. In other words, we assume that the government set the 
¯ ¯prices for PG and PR to guarantee that the public electricity company has no proﬁts.8 Then, the t t 
price of gas and renewable energy are linked to the domestic price of oil, according to the following 
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯expressions: P = P ⋅β/α and P = P /α. This implies that the government sets all the domestic G O R Ot t t t 
prices of the economy: oil, natural gas, and renewable energy. Alternatively, the government could 
set different prices for the natural gas and renewable energy, leading to proﬁts or losses in the 
electricity company. Simultaneously, the government compensates the company for the positive or 
negative result through public transfers. This strategy is also possible, given that the electricity 
company is state-owned. Both alternatives would lead to the same macroeconomic result. In the 
model, it is assumed that the electricity produced from renewable energy is consumed domestically, 
unlike Ummel and Wheeler (2008) and Bardolet (2014) who consider the implications of trading 
electricity from renewable energy for Europe and the MENA region. 
2.3.2 Energy services sector 
Aggregate production in the economy requires energy services such as transport, lighting, 
heating, power for industries, etc. We assume that the energy services (St) are produced by a 
competitive ﬁrm, using oil (OSt), and electricity using a CES technology given by: 
k k 1/kSt = [aEt + (1  – a)OSt ] , (7) 
where a is a share parameter and k determines the elasticity of substitution between electricity and 
oil in the production of energy services. Energy services are demanded by both the representative 
household and representative ﬁrm producing ﬁnal goods: S = S + S . From the proﬁt maximi­t H Ft t 
zation problem, we obtain the usual ﬁrst order conditions for the ﬁrm, linking input marginal 
∂S ∂S
¯productivity and prices: P ⋅ t = P and P ⋅ t = P .S O S Et t t t∂OS ∂Ett 
2.3.3 Final goods sector 
Final goods and services (Yt) are produced by a competitive, representative ﬁrm using 
labor, capital, and energy services according to a nested production function: 
1– h
h m m mYt = nt [(1– b)kt + bSFt ] . (8) 
where b is a share parameter, m controls the elasticity of substitution between private capital and 
energy services in production and h is the labor share. The ﬁrst order conditions for proﬁt maxi­
¯ ¯8. This alternative is equivalent to assuming that Gt and Rt are chosen to maximize the proﬁts of the electricity company, 
with marginal productivity of inputs being equal to relative input prices. 
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mization of the ﬁrm link relative input prices to its marginal productivity: w ,= ∂Y /∂n r  = ∂Y /∂kt t t t t t 
and P = ∂Y /∂S .S t Ft t 
2.4 Competitive equilibrium
The competitive equilibrium for this economy is a set of allocation and price paths that 
satisfy the following conditions: 
i) {c ,S ,k ,b } solve the household’s problem, given prices {r ,w ,P ,r ∗} and policies t H t t t t S tt t 
{TRt}. 
¯ ¯ ¯ii) {O } maximize the proﬁts of the electricity ﬁrm, given inputs prices {P ,P ,P }E G O Rt t t t 
and the exogenous endowments {G¯ ¯  ,R }.t t 
iii) {Et,OSt} maximize the proﬁts of the energy services ﬁrm, given inputs prices 
¯ ¯{P ,P } and the exogenous endowments {G ,R }.E S t tt t 
iv) {n ,k ,S } maximize the proﬁts of the ﬁrm that produces the aggregate good, given t t  Ft 
input prices {w ,r ,P }.t t  St 
v) The government budget constraint holds at each period. 
vi) All markets clear. 
3. CALIBRATION
The model is calibrated for the KSA using data from 1995 to 2014. The prices of the 
model are in constant terms and in thousands of Saudi Riyals with 2010 as the base year 
(tSAR2010). The quantities of energy are given in millions of tons of oil equivalent (mtoe). 
The production of oil and international prices: We assume that the production of oil is 
exogenous at 481.9 mtoe annually, which corresponds to the average for 1995 to 2014, around 9.7 
Million barrels per day. In addition, the international price of oil is assumed to be 1.64 tSAR2010, 
which corresponds to $60 (2010 prices) per barrel. 
Production function of electricity: The calibration of electricity production is based on two 
technical parameters, α and β, that measure technical or caloric efﬁciency of the oil and natural gas 
power plants and, using information from the EIA (n.d.), α is 0.32 and β is 0.42. 
The quantity of natural gas used in the production of energy is assumed exogenous, which 
for the KSA is a reasonable assumption, given that prices are administered and net exports of 
natural gas are virtually equal to zero.9 In particular, and consistent with the information reported 
by the Electricity and Cogeneration Regulatory Authority (2015), the share of natural gas in elec­
tricity generation in 2014 is 0.32. The remainder of the production parameters are generated using 
oil and petroleum products. According to BP (2015), the electricity generated in the KSA in 2014 
was 26.1 mtoe. 
The cost of the renewable technology: The cost of the renewable technology is key when 
interpreting the results of the model. The price of renewable energy varies substantially among 
technologies and even among projects with the same technology. However, to calibrate the model 
we need to choose a speciﬁc technology. In this case, and given the solar conditions of the Arabian 
9. It should be noted that this does not represent the total consumption of natural gas in the KSA. A large KSA 
petrochemical sector consumes a signiﬁcant amount of natural gas—but this is ignored, given it is not an input used to 
provide energy services. 
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Peninsula, we opt for photovoltaic (PV) solar power. In addition, each project depends on factors 
such as the weather, ﬁnancial conditions, labor environment, the cost of land, permissions, etc. In 
this work, we use, as a benchmark, the cost of PV solar crystalline silicon cells in the United Arab 
Emirates, given that, as far as we know, no information has been reported for the KSA. According 
to Bloomberg New Energy Finance (2015), for the KSA, the average capital cost of one MW of 
PV is 4.4 Million SAR and the capacity factor is 19 percent.10 However, it is worth highlighting 
that there is a signiﬁcant dispersion in the cost of capital—according to Bloomberg New Energy 
Finance (2015), Germany has the cheapest, with 3.8 million SAR per MW, whereas in Turkey the 
cost is 7.8 million SAR. We assume also that the depreciation rate of renewable technology is ﬁve 
percent, which is standard in these technologies. Using $4.4 Million (2010 prices) as the cost of 
capital, 19 percent as the capacity factor, and ﬁve percent as the depreciation rate, we obtain a 
levelized cost of electricity (LCOE) of 3.56 tSAR2010 per toe, consistent with Bloomberg New 
Energy Finance (2015). 
This relative low cost of the technology is critical to understanding the results of the model. 
Oil can only compete with solar technology in the electricity sector if the price is around $18 (2010 
prices) per barrel. In other words, from a purely technological perspective, moving towards solar 
energy and shifting away from oil is an economic decision when petroleum is valued at international 
prices. This positive environment for the deployment of solar energy in the KSA and in the GCC 
region as a whole is consistent with IRENA (2016), which states that solar technology at utility 
scales is competitive with a price of oil of $20 (2010 prices) per barrel. 
The LCOE reﬂects the cost of individual projects, but not the cost of the integration of 
renewable technologies. A fossil fuel electricity system can easily integrate a small percentage of 
renewables without relevant costs. However, the cost of the system increases as renewable pene­
tration becomes signiﬁcant, which we take into consideration. Mai et al. (2012) suggest that in the 
USA the cost of electricity increases by ﬁve percent when the penetration of renewables increases 
by 10 percent. Based on this, we set the price of renewable technology using the marginal produc­
1 
tivity deﬁned in expression (3) as with w = 0.5 in the base 
renewable production 
3.56∗ 1 +  w
total electricity production 
scenario. However, given that the cost of integration is a critical variable, we run the model using 
different integration costs. In particular, we run the model for w = {0, 0.5, 1, 2 ,3} which corresponds 
to no integration costs, ﬁve percent increase in the cost of the system per 10 percent increase in 
renewable penetration, 10 percent increase in the cost, 20 percent increase in the cost and 30 percent 
increase in the cost, respectively. 
Production function of energy services: The production is a combination of oil (mostly for 
transportation), and electricity. The interfuel elasticity of substitution between oil and electricity is 
assumed equal to 0.795 and is taken from Stern (2012)11 who undertook a meta-analysis using over 
40 primary studies, which corresponds to a parameter k of –0.26 in our model. Once we have a 
value for k, and using the ﬁrst order conditions derived from the proﬁt maximization process for 
the energy services company, we calibrate the distribution parameter a for the period 1995–2014 
and obtain a value of 0.33. 
10. The capacity factor of a renewable plant is the ratio of its actual electricity generation to its potential and the published 
Bloomberg New Energy Finance (2015) ﬁgure is used in the analysis. However, the ﬁgure of 19 percent might be viewed 
as a little on the low side given that according to the EIA (2016) the USA’s average capacity factor of 2015 is around 30 
percent and that Saudi Arabia has one of the highest solar radiation rates in the world. 
11. The interquartile range for the shadow elasticity presented in Table 2 of Stern (2012; p.321). 
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Production function of ﬁnal goods and services: The calibration of this production function 
requires some intermediate steps. Final goods and services output is deﬁned as the difference 
between gross domestic product in real prices and oil exports in real terms. We create a capital 
stock series for the KSA, using the aggregate investment from national accounts and a depreciation 
rate of private capital of 0.10, a standard value on the macroeconomic literature (see, for example, 
King and Rebelo, 1999, among many others). Additionally, we calculate the demand for energy 
services by ﬁrms, following Plante (2014). In particular, we use the expenditure by the ﬁrms on 
‘Coke, reﬁned petroleum products and nuclear fuel’ and ‘Electricity, gas, steam and hot water 
supply’ reported by OECD (2016) as a reference for our model. Given that the OECD (2016) does 
not report data for the KSA, we calculate the average expenditure on energy services during the 
period 2000–2009 for the USA, the UK, Mexico, and Norway, which are the OECD countries that 
have a signiﬁcant production oil and natural gas. Expenditure on energy services by ﬁrms represents 
0.02 of total expenditure. 
The parameter h represents the share of labor income in GDP and, using data from the 
Penn World Table Data (see Feenstra et al., 2013), is found to be 0.58. The elasticity of substitution 
between energy services and capital is assumed 0.42, which represents the average of the elasticity 
of substitutions reported by Koetse et al. (2008) for the period post 1979. This elasticity of substi­
tution is consistent with a parameter t equal to –1.38. Finally, the distribution parameter b for the 
period is 3∗10– 5. 
The utility function of the representative household: The intertemporal elasticity of sub­
stitution σ is assumed 0.5, which is consistent with Havranek et al. (2015). The elasticity of sub­
stitution between goods and services and energy services, σC , is set equal to –0.33, based on Plante 
(2014). And, given these two elasticity of substitution parameters, the calibrated parameter d for 
the period 1995–2014 is 2.8∗10– 3. 
The trade balance and the bond market: The trade balance in the model is calibrated as 
the average account balance, being a surplus of 0.16 of GDP. This ﬁgure also determines the 
ﬁnancial international position in the bond market. 
The calibration of the domestic and subsidized price of oil: The ‘domestic price of oil’ is 
not an observable variable since there is no ‘unique’ subsidized price of oil. The KSA energy 
system is heavily regulated, which means that there is a large variety of regulated prices, depending 
on the ﬁnal consumer (as noted by Matar et al., 2015). To overcome this, the domestic price of oil 
is calibrated. We therefore calibrate the domestic and administered price of oil to match the per­
centage of oil that is exported and the oil that is used to generate electricity. The domestic price of 
oil is 0.50 tSAR2010 per toe, with is consistent with a price of oil of $18 (2010 prices) per barrel. 
Table 1 summarizes the calibration of the key parameters of the model. To assess the extent 
to which the calibration of the model is able to reproduce the long-run characteristics of the KSA 
economy, some key average ratios of the KSA economy produced from the steady state of the 
model are compared with actual data taken from SAMA (2016) and BP (2015). Table 2 presents 
the comparison and shows that the model performs well, with a close correspondence between the 
model outcomes and the actual data. 
4. ASSESSMENT OF THE MACROECONOMIC EFFECTS OF RENEWABLES
PENETRATION IN THE KSA
We focus on two scenarios: a ﬁve percent renewable penetration (‘5-percent policy’) and 
the 20-percent renewable penetration (’20-percent policy’). The ﬁrst scenario is derived from the 
strategic economic plan Vision 2030 (2016) that envisages 9.5 GW of renewable installed capacity. 
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Table 1: Structural parameters of the model
Caloric efﬁciency of oil to produce electricity α = 0.32 
Caloric efﬁciency of natural gas to produce electricity β = 0.42 
Parameter associated with the production of energy services k = –0.26 
Labor elasticity in the production of ﬁnal goods and services h = 0.58 
Parameter associated with capital and energy services in the t = –1.38 
production of ﬁnal goods and services 
Parameter associated with the risk aversion in the utility function of σ = 0.5 
households 
Parameter associated with private consumption and energy services σc = –0.33 
in the utility of households 
Parameter associated with relative preference between private d = 2.8∗10 – 3 
consumption and energy services of the households 
Table 2: Selected macroeconomic variables
Actual data 
1995–2014 Model 
Oil exports / Oil produced 0.81 0.78 
Electricity generation from oil / Electricitya 0.68 0.66 
Total consumption / GDP 0.58 0.63 
Private consumption / GDP 0.35 0.38 
Public consumption (public transfers in the model) / GDP 0.23 0.25 
Investment / GDP 0.21 0.21 
a Data are for the year 2014. 
This level of installed capacity implies around ﬁve percent penetration in the electricity system. 
The second policy scenario assumes a more aggressive level of penetration, similar to those in some 
European countries such as Germany, Italy, the UK, or Spain.12 For all scenarios, the analysis 
focuses on the long-run equilibrium of the model and therefore the steady state. 
4.1 Shifting electricity production from oil to renewables
In an initial stage, we analyze the impact of shifting electricity production from oil to 
renewable technology, keeping administered energy prices constant. We deﬁne welfare gains 
(losses) as the increase (decrease) in non-energy consumption that leaves households indifferent to 
the new situation, compared with the original situation with no renewables and the implicit energy 
subsidies in place (expressed as percentage changes). The main result is that economic welfare 
increases as renewable penetration increases, when the cost of integration is low ( w = 0, w = 0.5 , 
w = 1). In these cases, the relationship between welfare and renewable penetration is positive. 
However, for high integration costs ( w = 2  and w = 3)  , there is a certain level of renewable pene­
tration, around 30 percent and 40 percent respectively, that maximizes welfare, as shown in Figure 
1 (a). These results suggest that the cost of integration is critical. An initial conclusion, from an 
economic point of view and regardless of the integration cost, is that both policy scenarios, the ‘5­
percent policy’ and the ‘20-percent policy’ lead to higher levels of welfare in the long run.13 
12. It is worth highlighting that both policy options do not really imply a liberalization of the economy; the government 
is simply replacing oil-ﬁred electricity production by renewable generation of electricity, but we do not consider other 
possible alternatives. 
13. It is worth noting that we ran a sensitivity analysis on the impact of a change in technology cost and the results 
show that the lower the cost of the technology, the larger are the welfare effects; however, there is no qualitative change in 
the results. 
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Figure 1: Steady state under different renewable energy (RNW) integration costs
In both policy scenarios, shifting electricity production from oil to renewable technology 
frees barrels of oil for export and results in a higher level of GDP. However, non-energy domestic 
production does not change; a result that might, at ﬁrst, appear counterintuitive. However, the shift 
in electricity generation does not change the prices that drive national production, that is, the 
domestic price of oil, the price of natural gas, the price of electricity, the price of energy services, 
and the cost of capital. Therefore, this policy does not incentivize local production at a macro level, 
despite its positive effect on welfare. 
As Figure 1 (b) shows, a higher level of oil exports lead to higher levels of public transfers 
to households. These higher levels of transfers imply a direct income for households, increasing 
their levels of private consumption. As a result, the model suggests that a higher level of non-
energy consumption and energy consumption and, of course, a higher level of welfare. 
Figure 1 (c) shows the impact on GDP, illustrating the positive relationship between GDP 
and renewable penetration. This arises as renewable penetration increases because oil would be 
released for exporting as shown in Figure 1 (d), thus leading to a higher level of GDP. Nonetheless, 
it should be noted that both policies would increase the oil export dependence of the KSA economy. 
Table 3 summarizes the impact of renewable penetration compared with no renewable 
penetration, showing the results under both scenarios for a selection of macroeconomic variables 
in the steady state. Hereafter, the benchmark for the following simulations is based upon integration 
costs represented by w = 0.5 . Under the ‘5-percent policy’, there is an increase in oil exports of 0.7 
percent, which is around 52 thousand barrels of oil per day. The positive impact on GDP and 
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Table 3: Change in selected macroeconomic variables due to renewable technology
deployment
‘5 percent policy’ ‘20 percent policy’ 
Electricity production 0.0 percent 0.2 percent 
Energy services 0.0 percent 0.2 percent 
Oil exports 0.7 percent 2.8 percent 
GDP 0.2 percent 0.6 percent 
Non-energy domestic production 0.0 percent 0.0 percent 
Public transfers 0.4 percent 1.7 percent 
Welfare gains percent 0.5 percent 
Additional barrels of oil exported (thousands per day) 52 207 
Figure 2: Contour line for welfare for different levels of renewable (RNW) penetration
welfare is relatively small, with increases of only 0.2 percent and 0.1 percent respectively. This 
policy can be thought of as a ﬁrst step towards the de-carbonization of the KSA electricity system, 
with a reduced impact on the economy. By contrast, the model suggests that the ’20-percent’ policy’ 
would have a much larger impact on the economy. Oil exports would increase by 2.8 percent, which 
represents around 207 thousand barrels per day, with a small increase in the production of electricity 
and energy services, given that there is an increase in households’ income due to a 1.7 percent 
increase in public transfers, and an increase in GDP of 0.6 percent. 
4.2 The impact on welfare of a decrease in the international price of oil
The analysis so far has assumed that the new policy has no impact on the international oil 
market. However, the KSA is a key player in this market and if it releases more oil onto the market, 
there is likely to be an impact on prices, at least in the short run. We therefore conducted a sensitivity 
analysis to link the welfare gains from switching to renewable energy and the welfare losses from 
a decline in the international oil price and the results are shown in Figure 2. This shows, for each 
level of renewable penetration, the decline in international oil prices that offsets the potential welfare 
gain from renewable penetration. It is clear that a relatively small decline in the international oil 
Copyright © 2017 by the IAEE. All rights reserved. 
Oil Subsidies and Renewable Energy in Saudi Arabia / 13  
Figure 3: Welfare gain for different renewable (RNW) penetrations as the administered
domestic price of oil increases
price offsets the beneﬁts from the shift from oil to renewables. In particular, a permanent decline 
in the international oil price of 4.5 percent that corresponds to $2.7 (2010 prices) per barrel, balances 
completely any potential welfare gains from a change of policy. 
4.3 Increasing administered oil price
As a complementary policy to switching electricity production towards renewable energy, 
the government could reduce the level of implicit energy subsidies in the economy by increasing 
the administered energy prices. This reduction could be carried out for different levels of renewable 
penetration and with different levels of intensity. Figure 3 presents the model prediction for the 
evolution of welfare if the administered prices were increased and shows that withdrawing the 
implicit subsidies would lead to a higher level of welfare in both the ‘5-percent policy’ and the 
’20-percent policy’ scenarios. However, the welfare gains are not linear, with the initial increase in 
welfare quite strong, as the domestic oil price rises, reaching a maximum when the domestic oil 
price is around 1.2 tSAR2010, corresponding to an oil price of about $44 (2010 prices) per barrel, 
and then declining slowly. The reason for this is that a decrease in the oil subsidy implies higher 
revenues to the government that are transferred to households, but at the same time there is a 
negative impact, given that energy services in the KSA become more expensive. Consequently, 
once the domestic oil price reaches a certain level, this negative impact on welfare due to the 
increased price of energy services starts to outweigh the positive impact from the higher public 
transfers to households. 
According to the model, an increase in the administered price of oil would increase the 
prices of natural gas, renewables, electricity, and energy services. Moreover, in the extreme case 
where the implicit domestic subsidy disappears so that the domestic oil price is equal to the inter­
national market price, all prices in the KSA energy system would increase by a factor of over three. 
This change in the domestic price of energy would discourage non-energy domestic production, 
which would decrease by 5.6 percent. 
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5. CONCLUSIONS
The objective of this paper is to understand the impact of increasing the deployment of 
renewable energy at signiﬁcant scale in the KSA electricity system—an economy with signiﬁcant 
implicit energy subsidies due to administered domestic prices below the international market price. 
This deployment frees up barrels of oil, currently used to produce electricity, for export. In addition, 
the reduction in the amount of domestic oil used to produce electricity diminishes the economic 
distortion caused by the subsidy. 
Using a calibrated dynamic general equilibrium model, we ﬁnd that if the KSA government 
were to deploy a relatively small quantity of renewable technology, consistent with the country’s 
recent Vision 2030 (2016) plans, there would be a positive impact on both the KSA’s long-run GDP 
and on consumers’ welfare. The reason is that solar technology, regardless of the cost of integration, 
is cheaper than oil for producing electricity, something that has been addressed in other studies 
(such as IRENA, 2016 and indirectly Matar et al., 2016). However, we show that integration costs 
of renewable technology into the grid do play a critical role. If the integration cost of renewables 
is high, there is a certain point that maximizes consumers’ welfare—around 30–40 percent based 
on our assumptions. Accordingly, the results suggest that the Vision 2030 (2016) plan to deploy 
9.5 GW (which is around ﬁve percent penetration) of renewable energy, would bring about a positive 
impact in GDP and welfare. 
However, two potential issues should be taken into consideration. First, a policy in favor 
of renewable policy will increase the dependence of KSA on oil, given that a larger share of GDP 
would be linked to oil exports and, potentially, to oil price shocks. Second, exporting signiﬁcantly 
more oil onto the international market could have a negative impact on prices. We do not model 
this explicitly; nonetheless, our analysis shows that the potential beneﬁts of the policies considered 
in this paper, which could result in releasing oil onto the international market, would become 
negative if the price were impacted in the long run—even if only marginally. 
We also analyze the potential effects from reducing implicit oil price subsidies by increas­
ing domestic administered prices, based on the principle that intuitively an economy not distorted 
by policies and regulations would perform better and have higher household welfare. Higher do­
mestic oil prices reduce the domestic consumption of oil, leading to a higher level of oil exports. 
This would produce positive welfare results initially, but the analysis suggests that the welfare gains 
would eventually peak and then start declining when the domestic price increases to about 1.2 
tSAR2010, about $44 (2010 prices) per barrel.14 
Interestingly, the analysis suggests that the positive impact on welfare of further domestic 
price increases stagnates and, at some point, turns negative because household welfare depends on 
private consumption and energy services. Reduction in the implicit subsidy implies a higher level 
of public transfer and higher income but at the same time an increase in the price of energy services. 
As in the previous case, increasing administered KSA domestic energy prices increases GDP, but 
increases the dependence of GDP on oil, given the increase in oil exports and the reduction in non-
energy domestic production resulting from the increase in the domestic price of energy. In addition, 
14. Of course, technical change in the fossil fuel sector or the renewable sector is not considered in the model. Technical 
progress in the oil sector would likely lead to lower prices (assuming that global oil demand remains constant) so that the 
shift to renewable technology would become less attractive in the model in terms of welfare gains. Technical progress in 
the renewable sector would have the opposite effect, since this would imply a lower cost of the technology or a higher 
capacity factor, thus favoring a shift towards renewable technology. 
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in all probability, the dependence of the KSA ﬁnancial markets on oil would also increase, but 
further research is needed to explore how important this would be.15 Furthermore, given that this 
research focuses on the long term and therefore does not consider the short-run dynamics, future 
research could also analyze the transition costs of moving towards an electricity mix in the KSA 
that is less dependent on oil, especially since renewable energy is very capital intensive, so that 
heavy initial investments are required. 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
We are grateful to anonymous referees for their comments and suggestions that have helped 
to considerably improve the paper; nonetheless, we are, of course, responsible for all errors and 
omissions. Furthermore, the views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not 
necessarily represent the views of their afﬁliated institutions. Baltasar Manzano acknowledges the 
ﬁnancial support from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness and FEDER through 
grant ECO2015-68367-R (MINECO/FEDER). 
REFERENCES
Alyousef, Yousef, and Paul Stevens. “The cost of domestic energy prices to Saudi Arabia.” Energy Policy 39, (2011): 6900– 
6905. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2011.08.025. 
Apergis, Nicholas, and James E. Payne. “Renewable energy consumption and growth in Eurasia.” Energy Economics 32, 
(2010): 1392–1397. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eneco.2010.06.001. 
Apergis, Nicholas, and James E. Payne. “ The renewable energy consumption–growth nexus in Central America.” Applied 
Energy 88, (2011a): 343–347. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.apenergy.2010.07.013. 
Apergis, Nicholas, and James E. Payne. “Renewable and non-renewable electricity consumption–growth nexus: evidence 
from emerging market economies.” Applied Energy 88, (2011b): 5226–5230. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.apenergy.2011. 
06.041. 
Apergis, Nicholas, and James E. Payne. “Renewable and non-renewable energy consumption-growth nexus: Evidence from 
a panel error correction model.” Energy Economics 34, (2012): 733–738. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eneco.2011.04.007. 
Bardolet, Miriam. “A common strategy for closer EU-MENA cooperation in renewable energy”, Chapter 5 in Cambini, 
Carlo, and Alessandro Rubino (Eds.) Regional energy initiatives: MedReg and the energy community. Routledge, (2014): 
84–100. 
Bloomberg New Energy Finance. “H2 2015 LCOE EMEA Outlook” (2015). 
Bouri, Elie, and Riza Demirer. “On the volatility transmission between oil and stock markets: a comparison of emerging 
importers and exporters.” Economia Politica 33, (2016): 63–82. https://doi.org/10.1007/s40888-016-0022-6. 
BP. Statistical Review of the World Energy June (2015). Available at http://www.bp.com/statisticalreview, (Accessed May 
20, 2016). 
De Miguel, Carlos, and Baltasar Manzano. “Optimal oil taxation in a small open economy.” Review of Economic Dynamics 
9(3) (2006): 438–454. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.red.2005.10.004. 
EIA. Electric Power Monthly - Data for July 2016, US Energy Information Administration. (2016): Available at https:// 
www.eia.gov/electricity/monthly/epm_table_grapher.cfm?t = epmt_6_07_b (Accessed September 29, 2016). 
EIA. Average Operating Heat Rate for Selected Energy Sources, US Energy Information Administration. (n.d.): Available 
at http://www.eia.gov/electricity/annual/html/epa_08_01.html, (Accessed May 20, 2016). 
Electricity and Cogeneration Regulatory Authority. Activities and Achievements of the Authority in 2014. (2015). 
Feenstra, Robert C., Robert Inklaar and Marcel P. Timmer “The Next Generation of the Penn World Table” (2013), available 
for download at www.ggdc.net/pwt, (Accessed May 20, 2016). 
15. It is worth noting that Malik and Hammoudeh (2007) and Bouri and Demirer (2016) found that there is generally a 
strong link between oil prices and the performance of the KSA ﬁnancial and equity markets. 
Copyright © 2017 by the IAEE. All rights reserved. 
16 / The Energy Journal 
Gately, Dermot, Nourah Al-Yousef, and Hamad MH Al-Sheikh. “The rapid growth of domestic oil consumption in Saudi 
Arabia and the opportunity cost of oil exports foregone.” Energy Policy 47 (2012): 57–68. https://doi.org/10.1016/ 
j.enpol.2012.04.011. 
Golosov, Mikhail, John Hassler, Per Krusell, and Aleh Tsyvinski. “ Optimal taxes on fossil fuel in general equilibrium.” 
Econometrica 82(1) (2014): 41–88. http://dx.doi.org/ 10.3982/ECTA10217. 
Havranek, Tomas, Roman Horvath, Zuzana Irsova, and Marek Rusnak. “Cross-country heterogeneity in intertemporal sub­
stitution.” Journal of International Economics 96(1) (2015): 100–118. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jinteco.2015.01.012. 
IRENA. “Renewable Energy Market Analysis: The GCC Region”. International Renewable Energy Agency, Abu Dhabi 
(2016) 
Kim, In-Moo, and Prakash Loungani. “The role of energy in real business cycle models.” Journal of Monetary Economics 
29(2) (1992): 173–189. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0304-3932(92)90011-P. 
King, Robert G. and Rebelo, Sergio T. “Resuscitating real business cycles,” Handbook of Macroeconomics, in: J. B. Taylor 
and M. Woodford (ed.), Handbook of Macroeconomics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 14, (1999): 927–1007 Elsevier. 
Koetse, Mark J., Henri LF De Groot, and Raymond JGM Florax. “Capital-energy substitution and shifts in factor demand: 
A meta-analysis.” Energy Economics 30(5) (2008): 2236–2251. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eneco.2007.06.006. 
Lin, Boqiang, and Aijun Li. “Impacts of removing fossil fuel subsidies on China: How large and how to mitigate?” Energy 
44(1) (2012): 741–749. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.energy.2012.05.018. 
Mai, T., R. Wiser, D. Sandor, G. Brinkman, G. Heath, P. Denholm, D. J. Hostick, N. Darghouth, A. Schlosser, and K. 
Strzepek. “Exploration of High-Penetration Renewable Electricity Futures. Vol. 1 of Renewable Electricity Futures Study.” 
National Renewable Energy Laboratory, Golden, CO, Tech. Rep. NREL/TP-6A20-52409-1 (2012). 
Malik, Farooq, and Shawkat Hammoudeh. “Shock and volatility transmission in the oil, US and Gulf equity markets.” 
International Review of Economics & Finance 16, (2007): 357–368. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.iref.2005.05.005. 
Matar, Walid, Frederic Murphy, Axel Pierru, and Bertrand Rioux. “Lowering Saudi Arabia’s fuel consumption and energy 
system costs without increasing end consumer prices.” Energy Economics 49 (2015): 558–569. https://doi.org/10.1016/ 
j.eneco.2015.03.019. 
Matar, Walid, Rodrigo Echeverri, and Axel Pierru. “The Prospects for Coal-ﬁred Power Generation in Saudi Arabia.” Energy 
Strategy Reviews 13 (2016): 181–190. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.esr.2016.10.004. 
Mendoza, E.G. “Real business cycle in a small open economy”. American Economic Review, 81(4) (1991): 797–818. 
OECD. STAN Database for Structural Analysis (2016). Available at https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode = 
STAN08BIS, (Accessed May 20, 2016). 
Pierru, Axel, and Walid Matar. “The impact of oil price volatility on welfare in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia: implications 
for public investment decision-making.” The Energy Journal, 35(2) (2014): 97–116. https://doi.org/10.5547/ 
01956574.35.2.5. 
Plante, Michael. “The long-run macroeconomic impacts of fuel subsidies.” Journal of Development Economics 107 (2014): 
129–143. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2013.11.008. 
Rotemberg, Julio J., and Michael Woodford. “Imperfect Competition and the Effects of Energy Price Increases on Economic 
Activity.” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 28(4), Part 1, (1996): 549–577. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2078071. 
SAMA. Saudi Arabian Monetary Authority. Appendix of Statistical Tables of the Forty-sixth Annual Report (2016). Available 
at http://www.sama.gov.sa/en-US/EconomicReports/Pages/YearlyStatistics.aspx, (Accessed May 20, 2016). 
Schmitt-Grohe´, Stephanie, and Martin Uribe. “Closing Small Open Economy Models,” Journal of International Economics, 
61(1) (2003): 163–185. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0022-1996(02)00056-9. 
Schwanitz, Valeria Jana, Franziska Piontek, Christoph Bertram, and Gunnar Luderer. “Long-term climate policy implications 
of phasing out fossil fuel subsidies.” Energy Policy 67 (2014): 882–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2013.12.015. 
Stern, David I. “Interfuel Substitution: A Meta-Analysis.” Journal of Economic Surveys 26(2) (2012): 307–331. https:// 
doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6419.2010.00646.x. 
Ummel, Kevin, and David Wheeler. “Desert power: the economics of solar thermal electricity for Europe, North Africa, 
and the Middle East.” Center for Global Development Working Paper 156 (2008). 
Vision 2030. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. April (2016). Available at http://vision2030.gov.sa/sites/default/ﬁles/report/Saudi_ 
Vision2030_EN_0.pdf, (Accessed May 20, 2016). 
Copyright © 2017 by the IAEE. All rights reserved. 
� �
� �
� � � �
Oil Subsidies and Renewable Energy in Saudi Arabia / 17  
APPENDIX
The household maximizes the intertemporal expected discounted ﬂow subject to the budget 
constraint: 
σ1 
c c σc 
∞
[cσt + dSσHt] 
tmax ∑ β
c ,S ,k ,b t = 0  1– σt Ht t + 1  t + 1  
subject to: 
ϕ k – k 2 t + 1  t ∗b + c + P S  + k –(1– d)k + = w n  + r k  + (1 +  r )b + TR .t + 1  t St H t + 1  t t t t t t t tt 2 kt
The ﬁrst order conditions that deﬁne the optimal behavior of the household are:
∂U 
∂SHt ∂U 
= PSt,/
∂ct 
∂U ∂U 
= β (1 + r ∗t + 1),∂c ∂ct t + 1
∂U kt + 1 – kt 1 ∂U kt + 2 – kt + 1  kt + 21 +  ϕ ⋅ = β 1– d + rt + 1ϕ ⋅ ,∂ct kt kt ∂ct + 1  kt + 1  k2 t + 1
jointly with the household budget constraint. 
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